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UMEROUS statements, ofhcial and unofhcial, have been made in the
past ten years purporting to describe the legal status of Formosa. It
’*’ ~ has been charged that Chaing Kai-shek has no claim to the island
because he is &dquo;merely a fugitive quartering his army&dquo; there and besides, his
is a government-in-exile.2 2 A reputable journalist maintains that &dquo;Chiang
is juridically sovereign where he does not rule and he is not sovereign where
he does.&dquo; 3 Another famous journalist asks the question: &dquo;How many
know ... that Formosa doesn’t belong to Nationalist China any more than
it does to Red China?&dquo; 4 Arthur H. Dean has suggested that Formosa is
unclaimed territory (terra nullius);5 both the governments of Nationalist
China and Communist China claim, as did President Truman in 1945,
that Formosa is Chinese territory &dquo;liberated&dquo; by World War II;6 and Presi-
dent Eisenhower has stated that Formosa is &dquo;in the friendly hands of our
loyal ally, the Republic of China.&dquo; 7 
,
These views all suggest a legal as well as political issue, and it is the
purpose of this article to discuss some of the legal aspects.~ It is not sug-
1 All references to Formosa will, unless otherwise indicated, refer also to the Pescadores.
In spite of the recent change in State Department nomenclature from "Formosa" to
"Taiwan," the former will generally be used in this paper since only recent references
consistently use the latter term. See New York Times, January 22, 1956, sec. 4, p. 2,
col. 5.
2 Detroit Free Press, April 29, 1955, p. 8, col. 1. Cf. the statement by the Council on
Foreign Relations, The United States in World Affairs, 1950 (New York: Harper &
Bros. for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1951), p. 26, to the effect that "by late
1949 ... the United States found itself in some danger of being left practically alone
in continuing to recognize the fugitive Nationalist regime on the island of For
mosa...."
3 Walter Lippmann, New York Herald Tribune, April 28, 1955, p. 20.
4 Mark Ethridge, "The U.S. Press is in Trouble: A Publisher’s Diagnosis," Saturday Review,
April 30, 1955, p. 10. Ethridge added that "Chiang Kai-shek is there as an interloper."
5 "United States Foreign Policy and Formosa," Foreign Affairs, XXXIII (1955), 373.
6 For Nationalist views see Han Lih-wu, Taiwan Today (Taipeh: Hwa Kuo Pub. Co., 1951),
Foreword; and various statements by the representative of Nationalist China to the
United Nations, UNSC, Doc. S/PV. 506 (September 26, 1950), p. 22; S/PV. 482
(August 29, 1950), S/PV. 503, 504, 505, 507. For Communist China’s claim see United
Nations Year Book, 1950, pp. 287-93; and A Guide to New China (Peking: Foreign
Languages Press, 1953), pp. 39, 41. For Truman’s statement see A Decade of Ameri-
can Foreign Policy, Basic Documents, 1941-49, Senate, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., Doc. No.
123 (Washington, D.C.., 1950), pp. 628, 694.
7 Department of State Bulletin, February 7, 1955, p. 211.
8 Perhaps the best works dealing with the political aspects of Formosa are those by Arthur
Dean, loc. cit., and Joseph W. Ballantine, Formosa: A Problem for United States
Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1952). Cf. also, Edwin O.
Reischauer, Wanted: An Asian Policy (New York: Knopf, 1955); W. W. Rostow and
Richard W. Hatch, An American Policy in Asia (New York: Wiley, 1955); and
Harold M. Vinacke, The United States and the Far East, 1945-1951 (Stanford: Stan-
ford University Press, 1952).
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gested that the following presents the only legal solution to the problem
of the status of Formosa. Rather it is submitted here that at least one solu-
tion to the question of Formosa has been generally ignored. This is the
argument that Formosa, by virtue of conquest and prescription, belongs to
China and that the question of which China is a matter of recognition
distinct from the question of the legal status. For a schema it seems ap-
propriate first to review the facts concerning actual relinquishment by Japan
of control over Formosa as well as the prevalent views of the United States
as to the legal status of that island from 1945 to 1950. Following is an
examination of developments after the outbreak of the Korean conflict.
Finally, a discussion of the legal status of Formosa in a critical examination
of various terminology used in reference to that island is attempted.
I
Apparently the United States during World War II reserved for itself
the right to determine what was to be done with Formosa after the war.
The only clear, although unofficial, published account of the thinking in
the Department of State about the future of Formosa during the war seems
to be recorded in the writing of Joseph W. Ballantine, who was at the time
the director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the Department.9 Ballan-
tine says that by the spring of 1944 it had been decided that Formosa was
to be occupied by military forces and that plans had progressed to the point
where the Navy rather than the Army would be responsible for the task.
The State Department at this time was in possession of information that
China was making preparations to take over the island. &dquo;Nevertheless,&dquo;
he adds, &dquo;it was considered that, while the participation of Chinese as
individuals and in an advisory capacity would be welcomed, the United
States should not ask the Chinese Government to take part in the adminis-
tration.&dquo; 1° Before a top-level decision could be taken on the State Depart-
ment view, the military decided to bypass Formosa and seize Okinawa as
the staging area for the final assault on Japan. With this development,
Ballantine continues:
A general consensus seems to have been reached by the planners that only if Formosa
were taken by United States forces in the course of combat operations would it be neces-
sary to establish a military government there, and that in such event the island should be
turned over to the Chinese as soon as this could be arranged without awaiting the
formalization by treaty of Chinese sovereignty over the island. It was also envisaged that
if an American military government was not established in consequence of combat opera.
tions, Formosa would be occupied and administered by the Chinese from the outset.&dquo;
9 Ballantine, op. cit. Ballantine admits that the "available documentary material on the
... sequence of events [in 1944-45] is fragmentary," and that his account is based
on his own recollections and those of Army and Navy officers and officials of the State
Department whom he consulted while preparing his book (p. 57n).
10 
Ibid., p. 55.
11 Ibid., pp. 56-57.
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Furthermore, the United States assumed that if China were given the
control of Formosa, the island would immediately be made a province of
China. 12 In spite of these views, however, Ballantine asserts that the United
States was unwilling to make any public pronouncement on the sovereignty
of Formosa, apparently because there was not a clear-cut view to be pre-
sented.’~3
There is nothing in official records to discredit Ballantine’s impressions.
The State Department stated after the war that the administration of For-
mosa &dquo;was taken over from the Japanese by Chinese forces assisted by small
American teams&dquo; pursuant to surrender terms dated September 2, 1945. 14
The Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces received instructions on
November 1, 1945, that he was to &dquo;treat Formosan-Chinese and Koreans
as liberated peoples in so far as military security permits.&dquo; ~5 President
Truman, in a statement in December, 1945, and again a year later, referred
to areas &dquo;liberated&dquo; from Japan and included in this term the island of
Formosa. 16 Furthermore, the President tied this idea of liberation in with
the Cairo Declaration which referred to Formosa, among others, as territory
which Japan had &dquo;stolen&dquo; from China. 17 There is little doubt, in fact, that
the United States regarded Formosa, after September, 1945, as being an
integral part of China. When the Chinese began to administer Formosa as
a province, the United States made no objections.18 Ambassadors and
Foreign Service officers in their dispatches treated Formosa as a part of
China.19 As recently as January 5, 1950, President Truman interpreted the
United Nations resolution (of December 8, 1949) calling on all states to
refrain from seeking special rights or privileges &dquo;within the territory of
12 Ibid., p. 58. This raises the question how, if the legal status was not yet perfect, Formosa
could nevertheless be fully incorporated into China as a legal subdivision.
13 Ibid., p. 54.
14United States Relations with China, Department of State Publication No. 3573 (1949),
pp. 307-08: hereinafter referred to as China White Paper. Han Lih-wu, former Na-
tionalist Minister of Education, in his Taiwan Today, p. 3, marks September 2, 1945,
as the date of the "Formal retrocession" of Formosa to China. Cf. H. M. Bate, Report
from Formosa (New York: Dutton, 1952), p. 275.
15 "Basic Initial Post-Surrender Policy, Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan, November 1, 1945," A Decade of
American Foreign Policy, 1941-49, p. 640.
16 Department of State Bulletin, December 16, 1945, pp. 945-46. Cf. also an oral statement
of September 14, 1945, by Truman to Dr. T. V. Soong, China White Paper, p. 939.
17 Ibid., p. 945.
18 See China Handbook, 1951 (Taipeh, Taiwan: China Pub. Co., 1951), pp. 2, 3, 332, 338.
Cf. Blair Bolles, "Vacillations Hamper U.S. Policy in Far East," Foreign Policy Bulletin,
XXIX (August 11, 1950), 2. Note also that the United Nations Year Book, 1946-1947,
p. 863, without qualification, listed Formosa as part of China.
19 See statement by John Stewart Service in China White Paper, p. 565, for a reference to
Formosa as one of the "national groups" of China; and to statements by Ambassador
Stuart (ibid., pp. 936-37) and General Wedemeyer (ibid., pp. 759-60) which referred
to Chiang’s as the "central government" of Formosa. Stuart also referred to Formosa
as a Chinese province, ibid., p. 938.
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China&dquo; as having &dquo;specific application ... with respect to Formosa.&dquo; 2° In
applying the China Aid Act of 1948,21 the United States Government ap-
parently made no attempt to distinguish Formosa from any other part of
China.22 In a special guidance paper, dated December 23, 1949, sent by the
State Department to Foreign Service officers around the world it was stated
that &dquo;Formosa, politically, geographically, and strategically, is part of China.
... Politically and militarily it is a strictly Chinese responsibility.&dquo; 23
The foregoing is by way of demonstrating that before the beginning of
the Korean conflict the official position of the United States concerning the
legal status of Formosa was that the island was (and had been since Septem-
ber, 1945) an integral part of China.24 In keeping with this approach the
Truman Administration, before June, 1950, maintained a hands-off policy
towards the &dquo;civil conflict&dquo; in China, particularly as it concerned Formosa .25
Furthermore, the State Department guidance paper referred to above stated
in 1949 that the loss of the island &dquo;is widely anticipated,&dquo; and emphasized
the point that the United States had no &dquo;responsibilities or obligations,
actual or moral&dquo; therein.26 It seems certain, therefore, that the attitude of
the United States in June, 1950, was that Formosa was historically Chinese
territory, that it had been &dquo;liberated&dquo; from Japan and returned to its owner,
and that matters affecting Formosa were strictly Chinese domestic affairs.27
II
Apparently there were many others nations in the world which felt the
same way as did the United States, but their attitudes did not become so
well known as that of the United States until after the outbreak of the
Korean conflict. Yet it was this very conflict which was the occasion of the
change of attitude on the part of the United States.
Immediately on the outbreak of the Korean conflict on June 25, 1950,
the &dquo;civil&dquo; conflict in China apparently became, for the Truman Adminis-
20 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, 1941-49, p. 727.
2162 Statutes at Large 158.
22 China White Paper, pp. 1006, 1017, 1028, 1032.
23 "Policy Information Paper &mdash; Formosa," Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings before
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United
States Senate, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., Part 3, pp. 1667-68: hereinafter referred to as
Military Situation in the Far East.
24 In fact on January 5, 1950, Truman said that in fulfillment of the Cairo and Potsdam
Declarations, "Formosa was surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and for the
past four years the United States and the other Allied Powers have accepted the
exercise of Chinese authority over the Island." A Decade of American Foreign Policy,
1941-49, p. 728.
25 Ibid.
26 See Military Situation in the Far East, p. 1668.
27 This is not to say that there were no dissenting views from important quarters in the
United States. See the China White Paper, 309, 1032; Military Situation in the Far
East, p. 1668; and a statement by Senator Elbert Thomas, 95 Cong. Rec. 3137 (1949).
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tration, an &dquo;international&dquo; conflict. On June 27 the President said that the
Korean conflict was &dquo;a ’direct threat to the security of the Pacific area to
United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that
area.&dquo; Accordingly, Mr. Truman &dquo;ordered&dquo; the Seventh Fleet to &dquo;prevent
any attack on Formosa&dquo; and &dquo;called upon&dquo; the &dquo;Chinese Government on
Formosa&dquo; to cease air and sea operations against the mainland. Further-
more, as if to emphasize that this was not merely a request from one in-
dependent nation to another, he added the ominous words, &dquo;The Seventh
Fleet will see that this is done.&dquo; 28 And if further evidence of the changed
attitude be needed, the President also raised the question of the &dquo;future
status&dquo; of Formosa and said that would have to await &dquo;the restoration of
security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by
the United Nations.&dquo; 29 In the meantime, he implied, the United States
was holding this question in abeyance, &dquo;in the interest of the essential
security of all.&dquo; 30
The (Communist) Central People’s Government reacted quite differ-
ently, of course, charging the United States with aggression. When invited
by the United Nations to state its case, the essence of its argument was that
Formosa was de jure as well as de facto an integral part of China on the
grounds that the Chinese Government had &dquo;exercised sovereignty over the
island&dquo; as a result of the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration, and
the Japanese terms of surrender. Furthermore, the Communists argued
that no one had questioned the fact that &dquo;Taiwan was an inseparable part
of Chinese territory de jure and de facto&dquo; before June 1950.31 Finally, they
argued that the United Nations had no right whatsoever to alter that status
by virtue of Article 107 of the Charter. 32
By the time of the Japanese Peace Conference in September, 1951, at
least two approaches to the legal status of Formosa existed: (1) that For-
mosa had been returned to China and the peace treaty could do no more
than confirm this, and (2) that the legal status was unclear and that its
28 Department of State Bulletin, July 3, 1950, p. 5.
29 Ibid. Cf. also Acheson’s admission that there was a changed attitude, as well as the
assertion that United States forces were in Japan, the Ryukyus and the Philippines
"as of right" but in Formosa in conformity with obligations under the United Nations.
Military Situation in the Far East, pp. 1729, 1763-64, and 1812-13.
30 Department of State Bulletin, July 31, 1950, p. 166.
31 United Nations Year Book, 1950, pp. 288-92.
32 This provides that: "Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action,
in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of
any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the
Governments having responsibility for such action."
For the various arguments on the issue (including the inference by the United
States that Chiang was on Formosa, not because of the Cairo Declaration, but merely
as a representative of the victorious Allies in the Pacific), see United Nations Year
Book, 1950, pp. 293-98.
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status might be cleared up by the peace treaty or by the United Nations
or by some other international action.
Unfortunately, the peace treaty did not clear up the issues. Japan
merely renounced &dquo;all right, title and claim to Formosa&dquo; as well as to the
Kurile Islands and Southern Sakhalin, without in any case listing a bene-
ficiary.33 Nor did the debate at San Francisco help matters. In fact, in spite
of earlier hopes that the question of legal status might be resolved by the
peace treaty, apparently this hope was abandoned by the United States even
before the Conference, for no attempt was made there (except by the three
Communist powers) to indicate a beneficiary of Japan’s renunciations.
Furthermore, it was quite clear by 1951 that the ultimate solution to the
debate over Formosa would have to be one acquiesced in by the United
States - for that country had obviously, and unilaterally, stepped in as a
protector of the island.
It might be thought that the Eisenhower Administration, on the slogans
of &dquo;liberation&dquo; and &dquo;unleashing of Chiang,&dquo; would have altered this situa-
tion. In truth, it may really have helped to clear up the matter to some
extent by entering into a treaty with the &dquo;Republic of China,&dquo; the essential
territory of which was listed as Formosa.34
The treaty itself provides, in Article II, that both parties will act individ-
ually and collectively &dquo;to resist armed attack and communist subversive
activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and politi-
cal stability.&dquo; Now it might be presumed that since the conflict in China
from 1945 to 1949 was a civil one, an attack by the Chinese Communists
would not be &dquo;from without.&dquo; Partly in order to make it clear that such was
not the case,35 Article VI specifically states that &dquo;for the purposes of Articles
II and V, the terms ’territorial’ and ’territories’ shall mean in respect of
the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores ... &dquo; and such other
territories as may be determined by mutual agreement. Thus it might well
appear that the United States, by entering into a treaty with a nation whose
only territory was Formosa and the Pescadores plus some minor islands, was
in effect recognizing that the rule over those territories was not only de facto
but de jure. The Senate, however, refused to accept any such implication,
for the Foreign Relations Committee inserted in its report the following:
&dquo;It is the understanding of the Senate that nothing in the present treaty
shall be construed as affecting or modifying the legal status or the sovereignty
of the territories referred to in Article Vl.&dquo; 36
33 See Article 2, Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with
Japan, Department of State Publication No. 4392, p. 314: hereinafter referred to as
Japanese Peace Conference.
34 
Department of State Bulletin, December 13, 1954, p. 895.
35 Thus in effect recognizing two Chinas.
36 101 Cong. Rec. 1168 (February 9, 1955).
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The Senate &dquo;understanding&dquo; apparently intended to take no stand on
the legal issue, but merely to maintain the status quo, whatever that hap-
pened to be, before the treaty was signed. But in actuality, the Senate
merely confused matters. For if the Nationalist Government is not &dquo;sov-
ereign&dquo; in Formosa, then the United States entered into a treaty with a
&dquo;government&dquo; without territory, raising in fact a possibility which the
United States Government had not heretofore even hinted at, namely that
Chiang’s may be a &dquo;government..in...exile.&dquo; 37 On the other hand, if Chiang
is &dquo;sovereign&dquo; on Formosa, and all other territory is &dquo;without,&dquo; then this
raises the clear possibility of their being two Chinas.
III
The legal status of Formosa has certainly been shrouded in vague and
often mysterious language. So far Formosa has been referred to as &dquo;stolen&dquo;
territory which has been &dquo;liberated&dquo; and returned to China; as territory
legally returned to China in accordance with the terms of the Cairo and
Potsdam Declarations; as territory taken over by the aggression of the United
States Seventh Fleet to be administered by the ousted former government of
China; as territory whose legal status would be determined by the Japanese
peace treaty; as territory whose legal status would have to be determined by
some international arrangement, probably through the United Nations; and
as terra nullius. It has been further asserted that the Nationalist Govern-
ment is the legitimate government of China pushed by civil conflict into
one of its provinces, namely Formosa; that it is a government which has
been popularly repudiated by revolution; that it has been illegally aided in
holding on to part of Chinese territory which belongs to the victorious
Chinese masses; that it is a government-in-exile (on territory whose &dquo;sov-
ereignty&dquo; is either in doubt or else which belongs by virtue of Japan’s sur-
render and the Japanese peace treaty to the victorious Pacific Allies or to
the United Nations, or to some other international grouping or arrange-
ment). An examination of some of these concepts appears warranted.
Formosa as &dquo;stolen&dquo; and &dquo;liberated&dquo; territory. It is submitted that these
terms have, in relation to Formosa, no legal meaning or significance. It is
difficult to imagine how territory legally ceded in 1895 to Japan,38 and
recognized in 1922 in the Four Power Treaty as being a part of Japan,39
37 Besides the reference supra, p. 276, to Chiang’s as a government in exile, cf. also Arthur
Dean, loc. cit., p. 373; and Claude A. Buss, The Far East (New York: Macmillan,
1955), p. 571.
38 In fact the United States participated in bringing Japan and China together in the ar-
rangements. See Foreign Relations (1895), Part II, p. 969; and Payson J. Treat, Diplo-
matic Relations Between the United States and Japan, 1895-1905 (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1938), p. 1.
39 43 Statutes at Large 1646, 1652; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922 (Washing-
ton : Government Printing Office, 1938), I, 33, 46. Parties to this treaty were the
United States, Japan, France, and the British Empire. China at this time requested
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could be regarded in any legal sense as &dquo;stolen.&dquo; It was hardly illegal in
1895 to gain territory by conquest and if title to such can be questioned
then a Pandora’s box of challenges to title to all other territories so acquired
(such as part of the southwestern United States taken from Mexico only
fifty years earlier) is opened. Clearly, the term &dquo;stolen&dquo; as used in the
Cairo Declaration has no legal meaning.
&dquo;Liberation&dquo; suffers the same fate. While the term &dquo;liberation&dquo; ap-
parently has military meaning (in reference to territory first lost then re-
gained in the course of conflict) and even political meaning (in reference
to objectives of governments to see unfriendly regimes deposed), it does not
appear to have any legal meaning whatsoever.
The references to Formosa as having been &dquo;stolen&dquo; and &dquo;liberated,&dquo;
therefore, can only have political (i.e., nonlegal) meaning. It is submitted,
although no evidence has been found to indicate that this was a conscious
policy of the Government, that these terms were employed in relation to
Formosa in order to avoid the terms of the Atlantic Charter by which the
United Nations, in waging World War II, agreed that they would &dquo;seek no
aggrandizement, territorial or other.&dquo; 40 Obviously aggrandizement has oc-
curred if territory legally belonging to the vanquished is taken by one of
the victors. Hence, the subterfuge that Formosa did not belong to Japan.
Formosa as terra nullius. To regard Formosa as terra nullius borders
on the preposterous. It is a generally recognized principle of international
law that land areas, in order to be terra nullius, must be (1) uninhabited,
or (2) inhabited by individuals who are not permanently united for political
action, or (3) abandoned by former occupants, or (4) forfeited because they
have not been occupied eff ectively.41 None of these possibilities even re-
motely relates to Formosa. It will be an unfortunate and confusing innova-
tion to try to make the term terra nullius a political one (meaning appar-
ently, in this context, territory title to which a foreign state is unwilling
to recognize as belonging to the state or government which exercises effective
control thereof ) .~2 In truth, there is no justification whatsoever for making
that treaties affecting its territories should provide for obligations on the part of other
states to respect its territorial integrity (which resulted in the Nine Power Treaty), but
made no claim that Formosa was included in this term, and did not protest the Four
Power Treaty. Ibid., pp. 272-74.
Cf. Quincy Wright, The Existing Legal Situation as it Relates to the Conflict in
the Far East (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1939), pp. 40, 65, and "The
Chinese Recognition Problem," 49 American Journal of International Law 323 (1955).
40 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, 1941-49, pp. 1-3.
41 M. F. Lindley, Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law
(London: Longmans, 1926), p. 80. Cf. also the sources cited in Herbert W. Briggs,
The Law of Nations (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952), pp. 250-51.
42 Arthur Dean, loc. cit., pp. 372-73, comes suspiciously close to treating Formosa as terra
nullius in this proposed political sense, if such is possible. He could have avoided this
difficulty to saying that Chiang’s China had Formosa by conquest, which has nothing
to do with terra nullius. Cf. Green H. Hackworth, A Digest of International Law
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940-44), I, 427.
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it a political term, for the same effects can be obtained from a policy of non-
recognition. And as a legal concept, the term terra nullius has no applica-
bility at all to Formosa.
Cairo and Potsdam Declarations as a legal basis of sovereignty over For-
mosa. Professor Quincy Wright has asserted that &dquo;the Japanese surrender
[based on the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations] was not a definitive re-
nunciation of the islands but a commitment to renounce them in the Treaty
of Peace.&dquo; 43 He fails to emphasize, however, that Japan actually did re-
nounce its title. Clearly then Formosa does not belong to Japan if peace
treaties taking territory (legally acquired) away from the yanquished are
still internationally legal. Furthermore, it appears certain that Formosa was
turned over to China in 1945, not merely in anticipation of Japan’s renuncia-
tion, but clearly with the idea that Formosa was lost to Japan and would
thenceforth belong to China.
The Nationalist Government as a government-in-exile. Two require-
ments seem necessary for a government to be in exile: the exile must be
temporary and it must be on allied (foreign) territory, not on domestic
territory.44 Chiang’s residency is hardly temporary and it would be difficult,
if not impossible, to assert that he is on foreign territory. There seems, there-
fore, to be no basis for regarding his as a government-in-exile.
Formosa as a part of China held by the de jure Government due to the
intervention of the United States in China’s civil conflict. The view that
Formosa is a part of China retained by the Nationalists through the inter-
vention of the United States in China’s civil conflict, though espoused by
the Communists, appears to be near the truth. That is not to say, how-
ever, that the action of the United States in intervening in the conflict was
illegal. This question apparently is unsettled, for while the historical view
has been that international law does not forbid a state to aid the legally
recognized government of another state to put down insurrection,45 some
43 "The Chinese Recognition Problem," loc. cit., p. 332.
44 Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (New York: Rinehart, 1952), p. 288. Cf.
F. E. Oppenheimer, "Governments and Authorities in Exile," 36 American Journal of
International Law 568 (1942); Sir Arnold D. McNair, Legal Effects of War (3rd ed.;
Cambridge: The University Press, 1948), p. 355; Ernst Wolff, "The International
Position of Dispossessed Governments at Present in England," 6 Modern Law Review,
208-15 (1942-43); State of Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, S.D.N.Y. (1951),
99 F. Supp. 655; and Anderson v. Transandine, 289 N.Y. 9; 43 N.E.2d 502 (1942).
45 See J. W. Garner, "Questions of International Law in the Spanish Civil War," 31 Ameri-
can Journal of International Law 68 (1937); L. F. L. Oppenheim, International Law
&mdash; A Treatise, ed. H. Lauterpacht (7th ed.; New York: Longmans, 1952), II, 232;
N. J. Padelford, International Law and Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil Strife (New
York: Macmillan, 1939), p. 176; J. B. Moore, The Collected Papers of John Bassett
Moore (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945), VI, 443; and Briggs, op. cit., pp.
992, 999.
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authorities say that there is developing in international law the idea that no
aid should be given to either side in a civil conflict.46
While the Truman policy appears to have been merely one of aiding
a legal government to resist insurrection, the question remains whether the
Eisenhower policy, in the Mutual Defense Treaty of December, 1954, was
doing the same thing or actually attempting to stabilize the status quo. It
would appear that the latter was intended, for the treaty speaks of attacks
by Communists against Formosa as being &dquo;from without.&dquo; The conclusion
appears warranted that the United States has intervened in China’s civil
conflict in aid of the legally recognized government and has furthermore
agreed to defend that government against any attacks from outside Na-
tionalist China’s present position. Since its present position is limited chiefly
to one of its former provinces, apparently the remainder of what were its
former provinces are to be regarded as lost to the legally recognized govern-
ment and an attack from them on the former will be regarded as from with-
out, that is, as an international, not a civil, incident. (Whether Quemoy
and Matsu are &dquo;without&dquo; apparently poses a different problem to be jointly
resolved by the United States and the Republic of China if and when a
Communist attack requires it.)
Formosa as territory whose legal status must be determined by some in-
ternational arrangement. As noted, there have been suggestions that For-
mosa’s legal status might be settled (after the Japanese peace treaty) through
&dquo;consideration by the United Nations,&dquo; or by some &dquo;international action,&dquo; or
by &dquo;ultimate validation by the Allied Powers with whom Japan concluded
the [peace] Treaty.’ 1 47 In view of the fact that the Nationalist Govern-
ment, as the representative of China on the Security Council, has the power
of veto, it is difficult to see how the United Nations can actually settle the
legal status of Formosa. 48
46 See McNair, "The Law Relating to the Civil War in Spain," 53 Law Quarterly Review
491 (1937); C. C. Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the
United States (Boston: Little, Brown, 1945), I, 253; C. G. Fenwick, International Law
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1948), pp. 244-45; Philip C. Jessup, Modern
Law of Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1950), p. 53.
47 Wright, "The Chinese Recognition Problem," loc. cit., p. 332. Wright suggests that the
"claims of the de facto occupant, the government of Chiang Kai-Shek, were acquiesced
in" by the peace treaty, even though two of the Pacific Allies (China and the Soviet
Union) did not sign the treaty.
48 For an excellent summary of this issue, see Benjamin H. Brown and Fred Greene,
Chinese Representation: A Case Study in United Nations Political Affairs (New York:
Woodrow Wilson Foundation, September, 1955), p. 39 and passim.
Wright, loc. cit., p. 333, offers the possibility that "The parties to the Japanese
Peace Treaty, most of whom are Members of the United Nations, are free under the
Charter, which would legally prevail over the Cairo Declaration, to dispose of Formosa
and the Pescadores according to the principle of self-determination rather than to
restore them to China according to the policy declared at Cairo." In the very next
paragraph, however, Wright reveals the unreality of any attempt to give Formosa to
any other power than the Nationalists which, since the Nationalists already control
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The Pacific Allies, outside of the United Nations, might attempt to solve
the problem, although the legal basis of their attempting to dispose of the
only territory which one of the members of the Security Council has appears
very weak indeed.49 Of course there is always the problem of which China
was the Pacific Ally. Until that is resolved apparently only the status quo
will obtain. If that problem could be resolved to the satisfaction of all con-
cerned then apparently there would be no legal problem.
There is one type of international negotiation presently occurring which
is making a decided attempt to settle the legal status of Formosa once and
for all. This is the negotiations between the United States and Communist
Chinese ambassadors at Geneva. While both sides are appealing to legal
arguments they seem to be doing so because their respective legal arguments
reflect vital political objectives. Both sides are, at the date of this writing,
apparently agreed to renounce the use of force in settling their international
disputes. The very real political nature of the conflict becomes apparent,
however, when Formosa comes into the picture. The United States has
insisted that the renunciation of force must apply &dquo;particularly in the Tai-
wan area,&dquo; while the Communists insisted that renunciation of force could
not apply in relation to one’s own territory and added categorically that
Formosa, weakens respect for any so-called objective legal solution to the island’s
status. Wright says that:
"These considerations suggest that there is no principle of international law which
would prevent the parties to the Japanese Peace Treaty and the United Nations from
recognizing the government of Chiang Kai-Shek as the government of a new state of
Formosa and the Pescadores, if by a plebiscite or other means it is found that such a
disposition corresponds to the wishes of the inhabitants of these islands."
Professor Wright does not suggest what could be done in case a plebiscite proved
unfavorable to Chiang or how the Security Council, with Chiang’s veto, could "dis-
pose" of Formosa in any other way than by recognizing it as belonging to the Na-
tionalists.
Furthermore, the United States has made an attempt to get the General Assembly
to consider the general situation of Formosa, but that body was unable to take any
action whatsoever and adjourned sine die. United Nations Yearbook, 1951, p. 262.
All of the above difficulties may have prompted Arthur Dean to say that "from a
legal standpoint" he did not see why or how the United Nations could formally settle
the legal status of Formosa. Proceedings, American Society of International Law,
April 28-30, 1955, p. 96. He further pointed out that if the United Nations could
somehow establish a trusteeship over Formosa, the Nationalist Government would
cease to exist "through total loss of territory." Ibid., p. 94.
Cf. also Vinacke, op. cit., p. 122, who observed that: "It is this control of Formosa
which has given the principal support to the National Government’s claim to con-
tinued recognition and to China’s seat in the Security Council and other United Na-
tion’s organs. But it has made this claim as the government of China and not as the
government of Formosa...."
49 In discussing the United States’ proposal that the General Assembly consider "the gen-
eral situation with respect to Formosa," the Nationalist representative said that "it was
unprecedented in the United Nations for the Government of one Member state to
question the right of another State to its territorial possessions." United Nations Year
Book, 1950, p. 297.
Cf. also the argument of the Soviet Union that China had been permitted to
accept the surrender of Japan on Formosa "on the legal ground that Taiwan was an
inalienable part of Chinese territory."
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&dquo;Taiwan is Chinese territory.&dquo; 11 Thus while each side is relying on legal
principles for its approach to this issue the actual legal status of Formosa
remains unchanged. These negotiations, however, have one real advantage
- should an agreement actually occur in line with one or the other position
advocated, then the legal picture would be cleared somewhat. Formosa
would either become part of Communist China (thus affirming the Cairo
Declaration that it be returned to China), or else Formosa would continue
to exist apart from Communist China (thus affirming the idea that China’s
conflict of 1945-49 produced two Chinas and their relations are now inter-
national rather than internal). In either case Formosa’s legal position will
not be very different from the de facto situation of the last ten years; that is,
it will still have been first, territory taken from Japan and given to China,
then part of China torn by civil strife, then finally either reincorporated
into China under a revolutionary government or permanently formed into a
new Chinese state administered by the former government of China. That
is to say, the legal status will result from political agreements all of which
apparently will merely confirm that Formosa is Chinese territory, regard-
less of which China is meant. An &dquo;international solution,&dquo; therefore, of
the type now being attempted, will tend to do no more than afhrm some
form of Chinese sovereignty, either Nationalist or Communist. It appears
doubtful that Formosa, through the Geneva negotiations, will be given to-
any non-Chinese state or group of states.51
Canclusion. The positions and attitudes discussed above all seem in-
complete as an explanation of the legal status of Formosa. The real problem
stems, not from present legal difficulties, but from political considerations
during the war which ignored legal principles. While it may well be argued
that some time after World War I it became internationally illegal to
acquire territory by conquest, it is an indefensible argument to assert that
such an acquisition was illegal as early as 1895. Until some decades ago,
conquest was certainly a legal method of obtaining title to territory.52 On
this basis, Formosa in 1945 had been Japanese territory for half a century.
50 See "Text of U.S. Statement of Geneva Negotiations with Chinese Reds over Taiwan,"
New York Times, January 22, 1956, pp. 12-13.
51 An instructive discussion on the political nature of this topic occurred in the Senate
debate over President Eisenhower’s request for congressional approval of the use of
United States armed forces to protect Formosa and the Pescadores. See 101 Cong.
Rec., 627-28, 648-52 (January 26, 1955).
Cf. also Richard L. Walker, China Under Communism (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1955), p. 321: "The American defense of Taiwan has not been entirely
altruistic. Taiwan is supported for strategic military reason and because of the im-
portant role it plays in countering Communist designs on Southeast Asia as well as
on Japan. Nevertheless, having recognized the Nationalist government as the sovereign
government of China, the United States is living up to its obligations under the Cairo
Declaration that Taiwan should be turned over to the Chinese government."
52 
Hackworth, op. cit., I, 427.
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Recent developments in international law have cast doubts on the
legality of title acquired by conquest. A series of international agreements
and both ofhcial and unofficial pronouncements - the League Covenant,
the Washington Conference of 1922, the Pact of Paris, League condemna-
tion of Japan, Italy, and Russia - had by 1940 created the opinion in much
of the world that acquisition of territory by force was illegal. In keeping with
this belief the adherents to the Atlantic Charter renounced &dquo;aggrandize-
ment, territorial or other&dquo; in their waging of World War II, and postwar
developments under the Charter of the United Nations have reaffirmed this
principle - the Korean conflict being the most dramatic incident to date.
In spite of these developing principles the victorious allies did take part
of Japan’s territory and turn it over to the de facto control of China. It has
been argued, however, that the de jure status of Formosa is unclear. This
argument, it is submitted, does not further respect for law. In the face of
all the evidence (the Chinese incorporation of Formosa as a province with-
out objection by other powers, the continued, uninterrupted, &dquo;sovereign&dquo;
exercise of authority by a Chinese government, the claim by a successful
insurgent Chinese government to that part of China not yet under its control
- namely Formosa), it seems unfortunate and unnecessarily confusing to
maintain that the facts are contrary to law and therefore to insist that the
confusion must be settled by law when obviously the de facto situation of
Formosa’s being under Chinese rule will continue to obtain. As Wright
has pointed out, a disharmony between a de facto and a de jure situation
has been soon removed &dquo;by the general recognition of the de facto situation,
thus giving it a de jure status.&dquo; 53
The legal status of Formosa, it is submited, no longer rests on the Cairo
and Potsdam Declarations or even upon the Japanese peace treaty, but
rather upon the recognition policies of various governments in the world -
i.e., whether they recognize the Nationalist Government as now existing in
one of its former provinces, or whether they recognize the insurgent govern-
53 Wright, op. cit., p. 16. For a further discussion see Ballantine, op. cit., pp. 195-96.
It is no argument, it is submitted, to say that since Japan did not name a bene-
ficiary in renouncing title to Formosa therefore the legal status of Formosa is uncertain
today. See Duncan Hall, Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeships (Washington,
D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1948), p. 39.
The separate peace treaty between Japan and the Republic of China, signed at
Taipeh, April 28, 1952 (U.N.T.S., Vol. 138, No. 1858 (1952)), contained in Article II
a similar renunciation to that made in the peace treaty signed at San Francisco. The
separate peace treaty, however, made references which appeared to recognize the au-
thority of the Republic of China over Formosa. See especially Article X, as well as the
accompanying protocol [Article 2(d)], exchange of notes and Agreed Minutes.
Although the treaty nowhere states that Formosa belongs to the Republic of
China, that country was nevertheless careful to create the impression that Japan at
least regarded Formosa as being under the control and jurisdiction of the Republic of
China and that such control was not conditional.
289
ment of the Chinese Communists. 54 In connection with the latter is the
further question of whether the recognizing governments hold that the
Communists, by virtue of the general success of their revolution, are auto-
matically entitled to Formosa or not. (It would seem that insurgents are not
entitled ipso facto to more territory than they have been able to take over,
at least as long as the legitimate government itself holds part of the original
territory.55) The present legal problem today, therefore, appears to this
writer to be concerned with reconciling the positions of the opposing blocs
of governments on the question of recognition and not with the question of
who holds title to Formosa. The problem of recognition, it is submitted, will
not be solved on the results of World War II, but on the lines of a strictly
political compromise looking to the avoidance of war in the Pacific.
In sum, this writer agrees with a suggestion by Arthur Dean (which the
latter apparently does not fully accept himself) to the effect that &dquo;Nation-
alist China may have already acquired legal title to Formosa and the Pesca-
dores by occupation or possibly by subjugation.&dquo; -56 Furthermore, there
appears to be no legal argument today which could deprive China of For-
mosa. Which China may, and will be, disputed, but that Formosa’s legal
status today is that it is Chinese territory seems indisputable.57 If conquest
was not a legal means of acquiring territory in 1945, then it would seem that
Formosa is still Japanese territory. To make such an assertion in the face of
Japan’s renunciation would raise legal problems which, fortunately, no
nation has yet seemed willing to face.
54 Cf. the statement by Werner Levi, Modern China’s Foreign Policy (Minneapolis: Uni-
versity of Minnesota Press, 1953), p. 295, to the following effect: "The Cairo Declara-
tion was implemented when the United States forces enabled the legitimate govern-
ment of China to accept the surrender of the Japanese and establish a Chinese ad-
ministration on Formosa. This administration has not been interfered with by the
United States or any other foreign power. That this de facto control over Formosa
could not be turned into de jure sovereignty was due to differences in policy among
the foreign powers regarding the recognition of the National and the Communist
governments." 
55 See Jessup, op. cit., p. 53.
56Proceedings, American Society of International Law, April 28-30, 1955, p. 96.
57 As a final observation, it must be noted that the status of Formosa, vis-&agrave;-vis its transfer
from Japan to China, and subsequent Japanese renunciation to title was identical to
that of the cases of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles which were transferred from
Japan to the Soviet Union.
